Rational decision-making under uncertainty requires coherent degrees of belief in events. However, event probabilities generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to exhibit incoherence, violating the axioms of probability theory. This raises the question of whether coherent event probabilities can be recovered from the embeddings used by the models. If so, those derived probabilities could be used as more accurate estimates in events involving uncertainty. To explore this question, we propose enforcing axiomatic constraints, such as the additive rule of probability theory, in the latent space learned by an extended variational autoencoder (VAE) applied to LLM embeddings. This approach enables event probabilities to naturally emerge in the latent space as the VAE learns to both reconstruct the original embeddings and predict the embeddings of semantically related events. We evaluate our method on complementary events (i.e., event A and its complement, event not-A), where the true probabilities of the two events must sum to 1. Experiment results on open-weight language models demonstrate that probabilities recovered from embeddings exhibit greater coherence than those directly reported by the corresponding models and align closely with the true probabilities.

Modern artificial intelligence systems, such as large language models, are increasingly powerful but also increasingly hard to understand. Recognizing this problem as analogous to the historical difficulties in understanding the human mind, we argue that methods developed in cognitive science can be useful for understanding large language models. We propose a framework for applying these methods based on Marr's three levels of analysis. By revisiting established cognitive science techniques relevant to each level and illustrating their potential to yield insights into the behavior and internal organization of large language models, we aim to provide a toolkit for making sense of these new kinds of minds.

Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) trained for next-word prediction have demonstrated remarkable proficiency at producing coherent text. But are they equally adept at forming coherent probability judgments? We use probabilistic identities and repeated judgments to assess the coherence of probability judgments made by LLMs. Our results show that the judgments produced by these models are often incoherent, displaying human-like systematic deviations from the rules of probability theory. Moreover, when prompted to judge the same event, the mean-variance relationship of probability judgments produced by LLMs shows an inverted-U-shaped like that seen in humans. We propose that these deviations from rationality can be explained by linking autoregressive LLMs to implicit Bayesian inference and drawing parallels with the Bayesian Sampler model of human probability judgments.

This paper is concerned with two theories of probability judgment: the Bayesian theory and the theory of belief functions. It illustrates these theories with some simple examples and discusses some of the issues that arise when we try to implement them in expert systems. The Bayesian theory is well known; its main ideas go back to the work of Thomas Bayes (1702-1761). The theory of belief functions, often called the Dempster-Shafer theory in the artificial intelligence community, is less well known, but it has even older antecedents; belief-function arguments appear in the work of George Hooper (16401723) and James Bernoulli (1654-1705). For elementary expositions of the theory of belief functions, see Shafer (1976, 1985).